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Page 3 of 5

Guideline for Preparing a Vulnerability Analysis for Correctional Facilities (cont.)

Target Identification

Target identification focuses on "what to protect" and is the identification of the people, areas, components, items, and actions to be protected. The threat to these items and the ease or difficulty of protecting the items against a threat are considered after the items are identified. In correctional facilities, there are several targets that the analyst should consider; they include people, important information, vital equipment, weapons, tools, and contraband.

People (Violence)

  • inmates
  • administrative staff
  • COs
  • contractors/vendors
  • visitors
  • surrounding community

Important Information

  • inmate records
  • personnel records
  • security-related documentation, e.g., CO shift changes, assignments
  • intelligence information
  • activity schedules

Vital Equipment

  • heavy equipment within the facility
  • communication rooms
  • security equipment, e.g., video cameras, sensors, transmission media
  • backup power source
  • weapons belonging to the facility
  • facility tools, e.g., shop tools, kitchen tools

Contraband

  • drugs (both legal and illegal)
  • money
  • alcohol
  • tools
  • weapons
  • electronic devices

Identification of Security System Objectives

Typical security system objectives for a correctional facility include the prevention of inmate escape and the prevention of violence, as well as the prevention of contraband smuggling which is often used to accomplish the other two. A particular correctional facility may have other objectives specific to its mission and these should be identified.

The correctional facility should also decide how effective their security system needs to be and what risks they are willing to accept, keeping in mind that no security system will be 100 percent effective. Documenting what risks are being assumed, given budget and other constraints, may prove useful when an incident happens.

Physical Protection System Element Identification

In characterizing the physical protection system, detection, delay, and response are all required functions of an effective security system. These functions should be performed in order and within a length of time that is less than the time required for the inmate to complete his/her task. As an example, an inmate decides on a particular path element to escape from a facility; an effective PPS should detect and then delay, while providing sufficient response to the situation before the individual is free. A well-designed system provides protection in depth with multiple layers of security that must be defeated in sequence, minimizes the consequences of single component failure, and exhibits balanced protection no matter which path of attack the adversary chooses. Protection can be obtained through various combinations of technology (hardware and software), manpower, and procedures.

Detection

An effective physical protection system requires that any malevolent act committed must be detected and assessed so that CO response can interrupt and neutralize the situation.

Identify and determine:

  • Type of entry control and contraband detection systems in place ( i.e. badges, COs using visual personnel identification, card readers, metal detectors, and x-ray machines, as well as opportunities for piggybacking and otherwise circumventing such systems)
  • Process for key control, combination locks, and seals
  • How packages are allowed into the facility, i.e.. x-ray and/or opening of package and visual search
  • How deliveries to the facility and shipments from the facility are checked
  • Procedures used to allow access or departure
  • Perimeter detection, including sensors on boundaries, fence fabric, gates, clear zones, and other exterior sensors
  • Interior intrusion detection, e.g., balanced magnetic switches on doors
  • Protection elements for the security system's infrastructure
  • FAR/NAR [false alarm rate/nuisance alarm rate] and system reliability
  • Physical and environmental conditions as they relate to sensor detection and assessment
  • Known defeat methods and records related to system performance
  • Performance testing related to assessing situations and emergency incidents
  • Integration between detection and assessment, whether detection activities are under surveillance by video or CO
  • Means and performance level of assessment by observation, i.e. COs in towers, monitoring stations (protection level), and ability to signal duress
  • Video systems currently in place and related components (switching equipment/video playback/video monitors/controller/ transmission medium) and the ability to monitor a location for rapid and immediate assessment). This information should include location, nomenclature, lighting, and camera view. Consider the degree of resolution required (for identification, recognition, or detection); the availability of adequate lighting (recommend 6-to-1 light-to-dark ratio for exterior); whether the view needs to be recorded constantly or periodically); how the recording will be conducted (manual, sensor-activated, or automatic); the method (real-time versus time-lapsed versus solid state); color or black and white; covert or overt; and camera housing (heavy duty/weather considerations/bullet resistant/nitrogen pressurized).
  • Whether the present detection and assessment equipment and location are adequate for the threat
  • Other responsibilities that could reduce assessment capabilities, i.e., respond to alarms, paperwork, and key service
  • Information available to the CO on the display board
  • Process used in establishing a secondary monitoring station

 

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