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Guideline
for Preparing a Vulnerability Analysis
for Correctional Facilities (cont.)
Delay
After detection and assessment, the adversary must be delayed
long enough for the response force to arrive and neutralize
the situation. The types of delay employed at correctional
institutions can vary from the CO themselves to locks, fences,
and razor wire.
Identify:
- Perimeter delay, including type of boundaries, fence
fabric, gates, concertina, and length, width, and covering
material of clear zone, such as gravel
- Vehicle barriers
- Construction of walls/windows/doors/roofs/floors/ceilings/vents
and other features of buildings
- Any use of dispensable barriers at the facility
- Any areas where detection is not provided before
delay
- Whether multiple layers of delay exist, including
features such as locks, windows, walls, distance, fences,
and razor wire
- Whether detection and delay are balanced around the
facility, i.e., hardening is roughly equal around the facility,
with no relatively weak spots compared to others
- Time lines associated with access delay
Response Force
Once the adversarial act has been detected, assessed, and
delayed, the response force should arrive in time to neutralize
the situation, if the facility has timely detection.
Identify:
- Types of communication available to COs, including
backup types
- Internal communication system for major events, (i.e.,
sirens, duress alarms, and public address systems), as well
as whether they are timely and accurate
- COs ability to monitor inmate communication
- Operator's ability to assess activity, i.e., ergonomics,
accessibility to equipment, and space availability
- Vehicles available to the response force and accessibility
by inmates
- Any personal protection equipment, e.g., gas masks,
helmets, and body armor
- Any night vision devices and other vision aids
- Response time lines, and whether time lines are adequate
for the facility and the threats
- Type of response force plans and training (both physical
and tactical), and whether response has been performance tested
- Identify the ratio of COs to inmates
- Identify the number and type of primary responders
for a given threat and the number and type of secondary responders,
should the need arise
- Determine post and patrol locations and responsibilities
- FAR/NAR records and policy on maintenance of response
force equipment, including ordering out of service and implementing
compensatory measures
- Whether the response force is armed versus unarmed,
use of force policy, weapons training, and checkout procedures.
Establish whether equipment is appropriate for the assigned
task
- COs ability to monitor diversionary tactics and policies
in places that address these tactics
System Effectiveness Analysis
The attached vulnerability assessment report performs only
limited analysis (a single path analysis using EASI). However,
correctional facilities need yet-to-be-developed tools and
methods to systematically, quantitatively, and thoroughly
evaluate their security posture and to plan for upgrades for
their security hardware and software, personnel, and procedures.
Such tools and methods would examine all undesired events,
all paths, and all security elements. Such analysis would
help to determine which paths into and out of a facility are
in need of strengthening, as well as the most cost-benefit-effective
security measures to undertake first.
Our current method of analysis for corrections, which needs
to be expanded and automated, is to consider each undesirable
security event, such as inmate escape, and to try to enumerate
all likely scenarios for inmate escape. As an example, the
inmate could escape from:
- his cell
- the common area in his cellblock
- the kitchen while on kitchen duty
- the recreation yard
For each of these, the ways of accomplishing the escape goal
need to be considered quantitatively. Our current tools at
SNL for evaluation of other types of facilities typically
handle situations such as this single-scenario escape analysis.
For example, if the goal is escape from a cell, then all the
paths from the cell to the outside need to be considered.
Such an analysis would examine all possible tools that the
inmate could bring to the task and would use established probability
of detection, delay time, and other security parameters for
the security elements in the escape path.
If the goal is violence, then violence scenarios could also
be enumerated and may include:
- assault on an inmate in the recreation yard
- assault on an inmate in his cell
- riot situation in the day room
For each of these, the ways that the scenario could happen
and ways to prevent it from happening can be examined. Violence
is significantly different than the escape scenario, since
there is probably less detection and delay, at least in the
same sense, that can be put in place before many of these
events occur than in the escape scenarios. However, a thorough
evaluation of such factors as (1) places where this can easily
occur, (2) methods of detecting that an occurrence is under
way, and (3) quickness of response can be used to evaluate
the effectiveness of the facility to handle such situations.
Currently, SNL has no tools that are easily adaptable to security
evaluation with regard to violence.
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